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For many IT-security measures exact costs and benefits are not known. This
makes it difficult to allocate resources optimally to different security measures. We
present a model for costs and benefits of so called Honeynets. This can foster in-
formed reasoning about the deployment of Honeynet technology.
1 Introduction
Honeynets are collections networked of computer systems which are intended to be attacked and
broken into in an observed fashion, keeping track of any (mis-)use. Similar to other IT-security
technologies there is a lot of gospel on the benefits of Honeynets, while there is little analysis
on the exact gain offered by them and the associated cost. We are presenting a model helpful in
understanding the economic aspects of Honeynet deployment.
In section 2 we present an overview of the technical aspects of Honeynets. Sections 3 and 4
collect benefits and respective costs of Honeynets. Following that section 5 contains our model
of Honeynet deployment followed by section 6 where we summarize our findings.
2 Honeynet Technology
Honeynets are a term used to describe one or more computers destined as being penetrated and
supportive technology designed to capture activity on the Honeynet and to decrease the risk
imposed by the Honeynet to other systems [2].
The usual setup consists of the hosts to be attacked connected via a transparent firewall to the
Internet. This firewall termed “Honeywall” is responsible for logging all network traffic entering
and leaving the Honeynet. It also tries to suppress grave attacks from compromised hosts in the
Honeynet by rate limiting outgoing traffic radically and by rewriting outgoing traffic on the fly
to stop known exploits initiated from the Honeynet.
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The hosts to be attacked are instrumented in a way aimed at allowing the operators of the
Honeynet to capture encrypted network traffic on the host where it exists in decrypted form
while users of this hosts. This is either archived by using trojaned binaries like SSH which
log data processed by them in disguise or by modifying the kernel to log certain system calls
resulting in a crude keystroke logging facility. The captured data is covertly transferred to the
Honeywall for logging.
3 Benefit of Honeynets
Deployment of Honeynets results in information gathered and possibly an increased security for
the operator of the Honeynet.
3.1 Possible Information Gain on Attacks by Honeynets
Honeynets can gain information on the attacks against them. We assume that a Honeynet can
basically gather two different qualities of Information: After starting his attack at ta the attacker
is unaware of the fact that he is attacking a Honeynet the data gathered shows the attacker’s
typical actions against the class of system the Honeynet is emulating. At a certain point in time
the attacker realizes that he is confronted with a Honeynet. At this point labeled td the attacker’s
motivation shifts which should also result in a change of behavior. td can be even before ta if
an attacker is able to gather information about the Honeynet out of band and attacks with the
knowledge that he is attacking a Honeynet. td also can be in infinitive future if the attacker isn’t
willing or able to find out that he is attacking an Honeynet.
It is safe to assume that after td the attacker will be more reluctant to act in a way which will
allow the observer to gather further information. The attacker usually will completely stop the
attack and vanish. But we also know of one instance where attackers using the Honeynet as an
IRC proxy just ignored the fact that they where observed.
While attacking the attacker will try to escalate his privileges. He will increase his privileges
in zero or more steps. The higher he was able to escalate his privileges the more likely he is to
find out the true nature of the host he is attacking which results in td moving into future.
It is therefore safe to assume that sophisticated attackers td is relatively early. [1] A sophis-
ticated attacker will be able to escalate his privileges relatively fast increasing his chances of
detection. For attackers with full local privileges detecting a Honeynet is trivial.
Honeynets can not collect informations on all kind of attackers equally. Honeynets are be able
to gather representative data on attackers which choose their targets more or less randomly like
autonomous malware and very unsophisticated attackers do. Gathering data more on focused
attackers can be only done for attackers actively choosing to attack the operators systems.
An attacker not penetrating systems in a random fashion must be tricked into attacking a Hon-
eynet by making it look like a worthwhile target. It can be assumed that the more sophisticated
the attacker is the less likely he will fouled by such deceptions.
So while Honeynets might be able to gather relatively much Information about unsophisti-
cated attackers or autonomous malware like worms, with the same investment much less Infor-
mation can be gathered about sophisticated attackers.
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3.2 Possible increased security by using Honeynets as an decoy
It is claimed that Honeynets can increase the search space for finding valuable systems in a
network and thus increasing security by luring attackers into spending effort attacking the Hon-
eynets instead of the real thing. This claim has to be evaluated against different adversary sce-
narios.
Attackers attacking random hosts in your network have a bigger search space. But only ex-
tremely unsophisticated attackers like autonomous malware can be assumed to attack completely
random hosts. Also these attackers can only be significantly slowed down when a significant
percentage of a network are Honeynets which is unlikely.
More sophisticated attackers will choose their target based on their objectives and on a systems
perceived value to complete this objectives. Simply by their existence Honeynets will slow
down the attackers target selection process. To foul the attacker in attacking the Honeynet the
Honeynet has to look more attractive than the target the attacker is aiming for or the “real”
system has to be hidden in a way that the attacker will not be able to detect it.
3.3 Possible increased security by using aggressive Honeynets for
redirection
There are also attempts to deploy honeypots as part of active network security. It is tried to
reroute attackers from a production server to a Honeynet distracting the attacker and allowing
further gathering of data [6].
The detection of the attack triggering the rerouting is a non trivial problem. Also the Honeynet
must mirror very closely the production host to make rerouting seamless and less detectable. Due
to this unsolved problems we will exclude aggressive Honeynets from further investigation.
4 Costs of Honeynets
Honeynets come with costs. Costs can be separated into costs for deploying and operating the
Honeynet and costs due to increased risk imposed by the Honeynet to the operators network.
4.1 Cost of deploying
The initial costs of deploying a Honeynet at t0 consists of the hardware, including computers,
network devices and wiring, housing, personal cost for setup and cost of fitting the Honeynet
into the policy framework of the organization. Since Honeynets are a relatively little understood
and very new technology, personal costs for setup are likely to be exceptionally high. Also since
Honeynets are something relatively new, explaining them to all stakeholders in the organiza-
tion, evaluation of policy implications and weighing risks against benefits is likely to consume
considerable resources.
4.2 Cost of operation
Operational costs consist of maintenance costs consist of fixed costs for housing, power, basic
monitoring and software maintenance. Considerable maintenance effort has to go into maintain-
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ing the Honeywall to ensure the security of itself and capability to minimize the risk of being
used as a stepping stone to attack further systems.
Between ta and td variable costs arise for IP-traffic, log space, forensics and active avoidance
of being used as a stepping stone to attack further systems. At td variable costs for damage
repair arise.
Since in the Internet there is climate of permanent attack, t0 and ta are likely to coincide. This
results in permanent incurrence of the variable costs.
4.3 Cost of increased risk to own network
By deploying a Honeynet the complexity of a network is increased [3]. Also less-than state of
the art protected systems are added to the network. This decreases network security and legal
risks to the organization running a Honeynet.
4.3.1 Risk to your Security
The obvious effect of adding complexity and not state of the art protected systems is decreased
security resulting in increased risk to the network attached to the Honeynet. Possible scenarios
include the Honeynet attracting additional attackers, unexpected interaction of the Honeynet
with other network components, use of the Honeynet as an attack platform against others despite
countermeasures implemented in the Honeywall or the own network or use of the Honeynet for
gathering intelligence about the attacked organization and it’s methods.
4.3.2 Legal Liability Risk
The main liability risk of Honeynets consist of the risk that an attacker uses the Honeynet to
attack systems of a third party and that this party seeks damages against the operator of the
Honeynet. Legal issues raised by Honeynets have seen up to now no in-depth analysis by experts.
While the whole “downstream liability” issue, that is liability of organizations whose IT-systems
are penetrated and used to attack others, has seen no consensus or even satisfying discussion by
the legal community, this discussion is often use to argue that there is no liability to operators
of Honeynets [4]. Such argument misses the important fact that the “downstream liability” is
about possible negligence in securing your systems against misuse by third parties, while with
Honeynets you are actually willingly and knowingly facilitate your network to be misused by
making it less secure.
This carries a risk of legal liability against the operators of a Honeynet not only in relation
to possible victims of an attack but also possibly liability of management in relation to the
shareholders of the organization operating the Honeynet. Besides civil liability there might also
be criminal liability depending very much on the jurisdiction applied.
5 Modelling
Based on this observations we can build a microeconomic model of Honeynets:
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In trying to build a model of Honeynet operation we assume that during the attack between ta
and td the attacker does a move every unit of time. He manages zero or more times to escalate
his privileges. Regardless of that every unit of time the Honeynet operator earns the same value
of information on the attacker.
5.1 Honeynet Operator
We model the Honeynet operator according to the following rules:
1. The operator of the Honeynet is not interested in observing attacks per se, but only on
attacks specifically aimed at his systems, since information on less focused attackers can
be bought on the marketplace. The attacker which is of interest to the operator will be
called qualified attacker and probably has the profile of a professional spy. We assume
that information on qualified attackers is not available in the marketplace.
2. We assume that only a an extremely small percentage of attacks are committed by qualified
attackers.
3. We assume an attacker stops the attack after he discovers the nature of the Honeynet. So
after td there will be no additional attacker activity.
4. At t0 the Honeynet is deployed and generates considerable fixed startup costs.
5. Every unit of time the Honeynet generates constant costs for housing, energy routine
maintenance and updates.
6. Between ta and td costs for additional resources like bandwidth and logfile storage, mon-
itoring, increased risk, restoring of the Honeypot and forensic analysis arise. While some
of this costs are per unit of time during an attack, others occur only at the end of an attack.
7. By investing in the Honeynet the Operator can make the true nature of the System harder
to detect thus moving td to the right.
8. For every unit of time the attack by an qualified attacker persists, the operator gains infor-
mation of a certain constant value. The information gained while attacks by unqualified
attackers is worthless.
9. On the Internet there is a climate of permanent aggression. This means that t0 = ta and
that the constant stream of attacks can be superimposed to build a constant attack pressure.
10. The Operator is not interested in prosecuting attackers [5]. Experience shows that compa-
nies are extremely reluctant to prosecute computer crime. Also the circumstances under
which evidence is gathered in Honeynets suggests that using such evidence in court would
be difficult.
We feel that this rules can realistically model most potential operators of a Honeynet. A
prominent exception are institutions whose mission includes information security or criminology
research. To these organizations qualitative and quantitative data not only on qualitative attackers
but on any attack might be of value.
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5.2 Attacker
We model the attacker according to the following rules:
1. The attacker has fixed costs like office space and Internet access.
2. The attacker has fixed costs per unit of time during the attack starting at ta.
3. The possible duration of the attack is unlimited and can converge to infinity.
4. The attacker learns at td that the attacked host is a Honeynet.
5. The Honeynet can not be perverted to remove collected information on the attacker. A
qualified attacker will not use it as an attack proxy to third party systems.
6. Since the attacker has minimal interest on fake data, to the attacker the Honeynet suddenly
turns out as worthless. The Attack is being ended.
These rules we use for modeling the attacker are a profound restriction on the types of behav-
ior in the real world by assuming that the Honeynet can not be perverted. Real world experience
shows that a seasoned attacker might be able to pervert all components of a Honeynet and use
them to his will.
Also the costs to the attacker are hard to estimate. One could speculate that an attacker will
use the cheapest forms of attack first and resort to more costly attacks gradually when failing to
reach it goals with the cheaper attacks. Than again the attacker might set priority to avoiding
detection and use his best, most expensive tools attacks at first to do so. This could be modeled
by including the specific risk of detection in the cost of an attack. We argue that most attacks
are in a the same magnitude and that the attacker usually does not base its decision on cost of a
specific attack but on his actual level of intelligence and perception which attack might be most
successful. Therefore we assume a fixed costs per unit of time during the attack.
6 Composition
Building on those assumptions we can construct two curves describing the cost and the utility
associated with a Honeynet:
1. The cost of a Honeynet is expressed by c(t) = S +Mt where S are the startup cost for
deploying the Honeynet and M are the maintenance costs per unit of time. Maintenance
costs are bound to be greater than zero.
2. The utility of a Honeynet is expressed by u(t) = PtM
I
whereas P is the value of infor-
mation gained by a single attack and I is the factor by which higher investments in the
maintenance influence the likelihood of being attacked.
The use of a Honeynet is profitable if the curve u(t) supersedes c(t). If we vary M while keep-
ing S, P and I constant we can find the optimum investment in maintenance for organizations
using Honeynets.
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7 Conclusion
While the start-up cost S seems relatively easy to determine, P and I are problematic. P refers
to the value of the Information gained by observing a qualified attacker. Since this information
is not available on the marketplace it’s technical value is extremely high. But we doubt that the
actual utility of this information to the operator is that high in all cases. Sometimes actions by
qualified attackers might only qualify as boring.
I expresses the relation between maintenance and frequency of qualified attacks. We are not
aware of means to determine real-world values for I but we suspect that the general frequency
of attacks is very low and can be only slightly increased by investing more.
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